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1. Lin’s Argument
This essay is a response to Lidan Lin’s “The Irony of Colonial Humanism: 
A Passage to India and the Politics of Posthumanism,” published in Ariel 
in October 1997. Lin’s founding premise, based on her analysis of the 
encounter between the novel’s Anglo-Indian and native Indian charac-
ters, is that “Forster’s ideological indeterminacy is primarily rooted in 
the humanist perception of cultural identity, a perception that tends to 
reinforce cultural distinctiveness, difference and distance in the arena of 
intercultural positioning and in so doing provides the epistemic basis 
for the historical emergence of colonial expansion” (133). Forster, that 
is to say, depicts Indians as inferior to the British so that he can justify 
imperial domination.
The next step in her argument aligns Forster with a Western human-
ism which purports to place Man at the centre of the universe as an 
“independent and self-suffi cient” individual (134). According to Lin, 
thinkers from the Reformation through the Enlightenment to postmo-
dernity contribute to this tradition; writers as diverse as Rousseau, Freud 
and Derrida have “limitlessly [infl ated] the ego and [incited] its desire 
for freedom” (134). But in this process they “neglected the subjectness 
of the other, and have said relatively little about its ego, desire and free-
dom” (134). 
Hegel, she says, also instrumentalizes the other, since he is interested 
in “how the other may be made serviceable . . . substantiated, ratio-
nalized, and universalised” (135). Forster’s position is now “congruent” 
with Hegel’s theory of how the individual is constructed. Maintaining 
that England and India will remain “two separate and incomparable na-
tions and cultural traditions” Forster “consolidates rather than disturbs 
the continuity of Western humanism” (135).
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For an interrogation of this position Lin turns to posthumanism, 
using Ponzio’s phrase “the humanism of otherness.” She believes that 
writers useful to postcolonial criticism like Bakhtin, Lacan and Kristeva 
fulfi ll Said’s desideratum of thinking “concretely and sympathetically, 
contrapuntally, about others” and they thus avoid “trying to rule others 
. . . trying to put them in hierarchies” (136). For Lin, Forster’s Ronny 
Heaslop is guilty of such a hierarchy-formation: his “imperial arro-
gance”—seeing his compatriots as ‘gods’—echoes the Raj’s belief that 
India cannot govern itself. Lin contends that Forster ultimately endorses 
Ronny’s rationalism “which is utterly beyond any native Indian” (138) 
and that Forster’s juxtapositioning of British rationality with Indian ir-
rationality is thus “clearly meant to be a critique of the latter by the 
former” (139).
Lin draws on Weber to establish links between rationalism, imperial-
ism and capitalism. Seeing this triple confi guration as embodying the 
world-view represented in A Passage to India, she maintains that Forster 
never intends to ironize the proposition that England should rule India. 
Mrs. Moore’s sympathetic identifi cation with India and Indians cannot 
therefore be read as rejection of “the historical emergence of Empire” 
but is instead merely a “regret for Ronny’s generation, which has virtu-
ally ruined the Empire with its ill-bred manners” (142). Mrs. Moore is 
to be seen as an apologist for a more enlightened, more civil Empire. In 
his depiction of Aziz’s “slave mentality” (143) and “lack of the power to 
resist” (144), Forster reveals his conviction of the coloniser’s superior-
ity. Lin thinks that A Passage to India shows Indians to be cowardly and 
childish, in marked contrast to later novels by writers like Venkataramani 
and Bhattacharya, where Indians possess “bravery, poise and determina-
tion” (145). The “stereotyping and stratifying ideology” which deforms 
the novel’s depiction of the English-Indian encounter is fi nally to be 
seen in the Marabar Caves incident. This drama reveals a racial binary in 
which Indian sexuality is “fallen” while English sexuality is governed by 
“culture and discipline” (147). So Forster’s ethnocentrism in this novel 
echoes earlier novels (Howards End, The Longest Journey), which refl ect 
his disdain for the English lower middle-class and poor. “Ensnared ex-
ternally by ethnocentrism and internally by cultural elitism,” Forster’s 
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liberal humanism cannot be sustained within the structures of imperial 
domination (Lin 149).
2. My Counter-Argument
My disagreement with Lin starts with her title “The Irony of Colonial 
Humanism: A Passage to India and the Politics of Posthumanism.” This 
immediately sets up a dichotomy between Forster’s [conservative] “lib-
eral humanism” and the [enlightened] “posthumanism” of Bakhtin, 
Lacan and Kristeva. Though much in the work of these writers is conso-
nant with my own interpretation, I draw on another postcolonial critic, 
Homi Bhabha, for whom A Passage to India is important. Lin presum-
ably wants her title to highlight the mismatch between ideology and 
political practice in the British administration of India. But she fails 
to notice the novel’s most important narrative technique: irony itself.1 
Her account is weakened by her confl ation of three narrative levels of 
Forster’s liberal humanism—the (implied) author’s,2 the narrator’s, and 
the characters’. She thus attributes values and attitudes to Forster that 
are in fact generated by the unnamed omniscient narrator, or by indi-
viduals in the novel’s widely divergent cast of Indian and Anglo-Indian 
characters.
This failure to register competing narrative levels occurs at the crux 
points in Lin’s argument. Most striking is her interpretation of Ronny 
Heaslop’s opinion that the British are “gods.” Lin claims:
In elevating the British to the image of wisdom, perfection, and 
power, Ronny is creating a hierarchy for the two cultures; that 
is, this elevation simultaneously debases India for its incapacity 
for self-government, an incapacity often associated with infan-
tility and immaturity. (137)
Because Lin aligns Forster’s with Ronny’s perspectives, she can confi -
dently claim that “one thing [Forster] never doubts is that the English 
are superior to the Indians; therefore, they should be allowed to rule 
the Indians” (146–147). But attention to the language of the text itself 
would quickly undermine this claim. In the densely-structured dia-
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logues of “Mosque,” Ronny’s reference to the British as “gods” is chal-
lenged by Mrs. Moore in an understated exchange:
[Ronny] “We’re out here to do justice and keep the peace. 
Them’s my sentiments. India isn’t a drawing-room.” 
 [Mrs. Moore] “Your sentiments are those of a god,” she said 
quietly, but it was his manner rather than his sentiments that 
annoyed her.
 Trying to recover his temper, he said, “India likes gods.”
 “And Englishmen like posing as gods.” (49)
Mrs. Moore, who speaks the true language of godliness in her references 
to the love that is enjoined by First Corinthians but which is nowhere 
exemplifi ed in the Raj, perceives the play-acting and inauthenticity of 
her countrymen “posing as gods.” Her gentle irony is preceded by the 
narrator’s much more damaging analysis of the zenophobia, parochial-
ism and mediocrity of the colonial administration:
A community that bows the knee to a Viceroy and believes that 
the divinity that hedges a King can be transplanted, must feel 
some reverence for any vice regal substitute. At Chandrapore 
the Turtons were little gods; soon they would retire to some 
suburban villa, and die exiled from glory. (29)
Amidst the viciousness of the race-war created by the Marabar incident, 
there is another “gods” reference many pages later. It is directed not to 
a member of the ruling Anglo-Indians, but to the lowest of the low: 
the Indian punkah-wallah who pulls the rope that moves the fan in the 
stifl ing court-room. Silent, instrumentalized, utterly unaware of the ju-
dicial and racial issues swirling around him, he is all the same seen as a 
“god” by Forster’s omniscient narrator. In these instances the novel’s nar-
rative strategies, modulating between authorial pronouncements and the 
perspectives of characters carried by dialogue, set up a series of echoes 
which are as bewildering and contradictory as the Marabar echo itself. 
They deconstruct the certainties of an ideologically-driven reading.
The analysis in Sections 3–5 of this paper is devoted to the proposi-
tion that Forster problematizes the ideology of liberal humanism. He 
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does this both in his deployment of irony as a narrative technique, and 
in the way he dramatizes the connections between seeing and knowing 
so as to challenge the Raj’s hegemonic discourse. Far from “construct-
ing the independent and self-suffi cient Man” or “plac[ing] Man at the 
centre of the universe . . . defend[ing] him against any second force, be 
it theological, natural, social or cultural” (Lin 134), A Passage to India 
reveals in my view that the West is not the “dwelling place of meaning.” 
The fi rst words of the fi rst chapter show the novel’s subversive project to 
decentre Western thinking by illustrating the materiality of language as 
culturally constructed and institutionally produced.
I agree with the critics who write about the complexity and ambiguity 
apparent in A Passage to India,3 when they suggest that Forster’s use of 
language is unlike anything in his previous fi ction. Bette London char-
acterizes this view when she remarks:
Read in the context of Forster’s earlier novels, what is strik-
ing about Passage is the absence of the distinctly discernible 
Forsterian voice: urbane, ironic, assured. What we have in its 
stead is a narrative gone mad—a shifting, slippery, unplace-
able voice that seems to take its timbre from whatever voice it 
happens to be near. The resulting disturbances to the novel’s 
surface articulate what might be called narrative hysteria: the 
breakdown or fragmentation of the narrative voice. The voice 
does not disappear, as several critics have claimed, but it per-
sists, like the novel’s celebrated echo, in distorted refractions of 
an original utterance that can never be reclaimed. (86)
The central weakness of Lin’s argument stems from a failure to consider 
these complexities of representation in A Passage’s narrative structure. 
There are also problems to do with cultural and historical positioning. 
In an otherwise painstaking account of the evolution of Western hu-
manism it is surely not legitimate to compare a novel published in 1924 
by a British author with novels written in 1932 and 1947 by Indian au-
thors; to do so begs too many questions. And it is inaccurate to confl ate 
A Passage with earlier novels—Howards End and The Longest Journey—
in terms of Forster’s different use of language in these novels and be-
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cause neither is set in India at the time of the Raj. Finally, the contrast 
between English “rationality” and Indian “irrationality,” like that be-
tween an English sexuality restrained by “culture and discipline” and an 
Indian sexuality which exemplifi es “fallenness,” though crucial to Lin’s 
argument, is contradicted by the narrator’s frequent interventions and 
perspectives. 
As the areas of narrative design that Lin omits are signifi cant to an 
understanding of Forster, I shall give them detailed attention. Section 
3 deals mainly with ironies, linking them to “focalization” (which will 
be explained later), and to Homi Bhabha’s insights into cultural alter-
ity. Section 4 looks at the notion of the reversed imperial gaze and the 
processes of seeing and speaking as they relate to colonizer and colonized. 
Section 5 attempts to address Forster’s use of omniscient narration in A 
Passage, and I look at the novel’s elusive implied author. 
3. Irony, Focalization, and Cultural Difference
Registering the novel’s ironies depends on perceiving multiple narrative 
layers and analyzing the processes of focalization4 given to the omni-
scient narrator and the characters. To discuss these strategies I will draw 
on Homi Bhabha’s The Location of Culture. Saturated with Conrad’s 
“Heart of Darkness” and Forster’s A Passage to India, Bhabha articu-
lates postcolonial theory by using modernist fi ction. Charlie Marlow 
and Adela Quested return from their respective encounters with alien 
cultures disoriented and demoralized, signalling their authors’ awareness 
of the consequences for Western “civilization” of engaging with other 
histories and other geographies. In this respect fi ction leads theory, since 
Bhabha’s 1994 formulations develop and formalise what Forster clearly 
understood in 1924. Several of Bhabha’s concepts, particularly those of 
difference, colonial ambivalence, and stereotyping in colonial discourse, can 
yield insights into the ironies of A Passage to India. I will limit my argu-
ment to Bhabha’s discussion of cultural difference, since for Bhabha as 
for Lin, although in opposing ways, the notion of difference is central. 
Bhabha insists in The Location of Culture that “critical theory rests. . . 
on the notion of cultural difference, not cultural diversity” (34). 
“Cultural difference” for Bhabha has to be enunciated, and in this pro-
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cess a split necessarily occurs between “a stable system of reference, and 
. . . the articulation of new demands, meanings, strategies . . . as a prac-
tice of domination, or resistance” (35). In other words, cultural differ-
ence is immediately caught up in issues of power: who governs and who 
is governed?5 But for Lin “cultural difference” has very different reso-
nances; its representation in the novel is conservative rather than sedi-
tious. I will argue that Bhabha’s notion of cultural difference is every-
where anticipated in A Passage to India. 
The disruption of Western metaphysical categories begins with the 
ostensibly value-free omniscient panoramic perspective of the open-
ing chapter, which is itself a strategy to undermine authorial control.6 
Chandrapore’s formlessness described by the omniscient narrator de-
feats the spectator’s gaze: “the very wood seems made of mud, the in-
habitants of mud moving” (9). The nature/culture dichotomy central to 
European thought is destabilized as we move from Chandrapore to the 
carefully constructed verdure of the Civil Station, centre of British con-
trol: “viewed hence Chandrapore appears to be a totally different place. 
It is a city of gardens. It is no city but a forest sparsely scattered with 
huts” (10). The Raj fi nds psychological reassurance in this imposition of 
the tranquillity and order of English gardens on India. Yet their verdure 
is composed of non-English exotic vegetation: toddy palms, neem trees, 
mangoes and peepul. And the narrator makes it clear that no aspect of 
human agency like the creation of gardens can compete with the power 
of an Indian nature that is outside human control: “The sky settles ev-
erything—not only climates and seasons but when the earth shall be 
beautiful. By herself she can do little—only feeble outbursts of fl owers. 
But when the sky chooses, glory can rain in to the Chandrapore bazaars 
or a benediction pass from horizon to horizon”(10). 
The novel thus opens with a challenge to the prevailing faith (held by 
the British) in human agency to impose culture on nature. It closes with 
an insight that preempts Bhabha: the representation of cultural differ-
ence foregrounds issues of power:
“Why can’t we be friends now?” said [Fielding] holding [Aziz] 
affectionately. 
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 “It’s what I want. It’s what you want.”
 But the horses didn’t want it—they swerved apart; the earth 
didn’t want it, sending up rocks through which riders must 
pass single fi le; the temples, the tank, the jail, the palace, the 
birds, the carrion, the Guest House, that came into view as 
they issued from the gap and saw Mau beneath: they didn’t 
want it, they said in their hundred voices, “No, not yet”, and 
the sky said “No, not there.” (317)
The whole novel can be read as structurally enacting cultural difference, 
hence the asymmetry of its three parts—Mosque, Caves, Temple. A cru-
cial colonial ruling strategy—the nature/culture dichotomy—is over-
turned. “Temple” is both culture and nature, and neither culture nor 
nature; the world is differently constructed from our habitual Western 
perspectives. This section does not balance the other two parts of the 
novel, and is in no sense the fi nal resolution of a triad or trinity. Cultural 
differences are negatively conveyed in the Raj’s racist stereotypes whose 
insane malignancy builds to a race war. But cultural difference is also 
presented in Fielding’s world-view, whose enlightened liberal human-
ism cannot rescue the Raj. Built on courtesy, kindness and balance, the 
schoolmaster’s philosophy relies on empiricist values, sees “mystery” and 
“muddle” as indistinguishable, and cannot cope with the apparent form-
lessness of India, her “idol temples and lumpy hills.” The Fielding per-
spective, advanced as it is in relation to other Anglo-Indians, is funda-
mentally Eurocentric. The narrator comments: “To regard an Indian as 
if he were an Italian is not, for instance, a common error, nor perhaps a 
fatal one, and Fielding often attempted analogies between this peninsula 
and that other, smaller and more exquisitely shaped, that stretches into 
the classic waters of the Mediterranean” (61). Aware of racial and gender 
disparities in colonial India,7 the schoolmaster is insightful but helpless. 
He turns for relief to an Italy that embodies “the harmony between the 
works of man and the earth that upholds them, the civilization that has 
escaped muddle, the spirit in a reasonable form”(275). Neither Fielding 
as enlightened Anglo-Indian nor Aziz as Muslim Indian can be part of 
Hindu India, from which the implied author is also excluded. 
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The Indian landscape does not convey to European protagonists the 
uplifting emotions they associate with the Alps or the Lake District. Exit 
the Romantic Sublime. Enter its dark double, the Freudian Uncanny or 
Unheimlich.8 Of the Westerners, only Mrs. Moore enjoys this confus-
ingly double vision (“What a terrible river! What a wonderful river!” 
32) although her initial fearlessness is overtaken in the Caves section 
by a demoralization from which she is unable to recover. The Indian 
landscape is not as the English landscape; the Marabar has nothing in 
common with Grasmere. “No Indian animal,” we read, “has any sense 
of an interior. Bats, rats, birds, insects will as soon nest inside a house 
as out; it is to them a normal growth of the eternal jungle, which al-
ternately produces trees, houses, trees” (35). Even the gentle evange-
lism of old Mr. Graysford and young Mr. Sorley (“In our Father’s house 
are many mansions, they taught, and there alone will the incompatible 
multitudes of mankind be welcomed and soothed” 38) rests on legislat-
ing difference. Monkeys may conceivably “have their collateral share of 
bliss” as may jackals and other mammals. But wasps? And oranges, cac-
tuses, crystals and mud? And the bacteria inside Mr. Sorley? No, no, this 
is going too far. We must exclude someone from our gathering, or we 
shall be left with nothing”(38). The perspectives of the implied author, 
as deduced by the reader of the text’s multiple narrative levels, thus con-
tinually foreground difference between the Raj and Anglo-India as a po-
litical principle that will eventually erupt in the violence precipitated by 
the Marabar.
4. The Imperial Gaze
Difference is an essential component of Anglo-Indian/Indian identity, 
and the difference between ruler and ruled is marked by processes of 
seeing and speaking. 9 Here Forster anticipates the quite recent postcolo-
nial theory that is interested in the correlations between looking behav-
iour and political power. E. Ann Kaplan writes:
The gaze of the colonialist . . . refuses to acknowledge its own 
power and privilege: it unconsciously represses knowledge of 
power hierarchies and its need to dominate, to control. Like 
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the male gaze, it’s an objectifying gaze, one that refuses mutual 
gazing, mutual subject-to-subject recognition. It refuses what I 
am calling a ‘looking relation.’ (79) 
At the heart of A Passage to India is the desire of Adela Quested “to see 
the real India” (25). 10 Her story dramatizes the transition from Kaplan’s 
“objectifying gaze” that refuses mutual gazing to a “looking relation” 
that acknowledges equivalent subjectivity. In the Courtroom Adela, 
questioned by McBride, is about to reconstruct the events that led to her 
alleged assault in the Marabar Caves. Suddenly she has radical doubts 
about the legitimacy of the judicial process through which India stands 
accused by Anglo-India:
In virtue of what had she collected this roomful of people to-
gether? Her particular brand of opinions, and the suburban 
Jehovah who sanctifi ed them—by what right did they claim so 
much importance in the world, and assume the title of civilisa-
tion? (221) 
At the crucial moment, Adela cannot bring together the procedures 
of the court with the fate of Aziz: “the court, the place of question, 
awaited her reply. But she could not give it until Aziz entered the place 
of answer” (222). Surely this fraught moment in fi ction gives rise to 
Bhabha’s formulations of what he describes as the third space of enuncia-
tion, where “the place of utterance is crossed by the différance of writ-
ing” (36). Bhabha remarks:
The intervention of the third space of enunciation, which 
makes the structure of meaning and reference an ambivalent 
process, destroys [the] mirror of representation in which cul-
tural knowledge is customarily revealed as an integrated, open, 
expanding code. Such an intervention quite properly challeng-
es our sense of the historical identity of culture as a homoge-
nising, unifying force, authenticated by the originary Past, kept 
alive in the national tradition of the People. (37) 
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In her mind’s eye, Adela has failed to locate Aziz entering “the place of 
answer,” the notorious Marabar Caves. Because she cannot see him, she 
cannot speak for him. This signifi cant association of the gaze with the 
process of self-refl ection undermines racial superiority, and has already 
been signalled by Adela’s encounter in the courtroom with the Punkah 
Wallah. An instrumentalized individual of Untouchable caste he hap-
pens to embody physical perfection:
The Court was crowded and of course very hot, and the fi rst 
person Adela noticed in it was the humblest of all who were 
present, a person who had no bearing offi cially upon the trial: 
the man who pulled the punkah. Almost naked, and splendidly 
formed, he sat on a raised platform near the back, in middle of 
the central gangway, and he caught her attention as she came in, 
and he seemed to control the proceedings. He had the strength 
and beauty that sometimes come to fl ower in Indians of low 
birth. When that strange race nears the dust and is condemned 
as untouchable, then nature remembers the physical perfection 
that she accomplished elsewhere, and throws out a god—not 
many, but one here and there, to prove to society how little its 
categories impress her. (212) 
The existence of an individual like the Punkah Wallah in a courtroom 
representing imperial justice is doubly seditious. He clearly connects 
with no “originary Past” and speaks for no “national tradition of the 
People” (Bhabha 37). In fact, he does not speak at all. His presence 
cannot authorize the legal transactions that already seem farcical to 
Adela. To recognize his beauty is to start a process of deconstructing im-
perial privilege that will lead inevitably to Adela’s retraction of the accu-
sation against Aziz and to the proclamation of his innocence. Her whole 
identity as an Anglo-Indian female engaged to Ronny Heaslop, labelled 
by an oppressive system of genteel female subordination and disempow-
erment, begins to unravel. In Bhabha’s terms, what is at stake here is an 
interrogation “not simply of the image of the person, but the discursive 
and disciplinary place from which questions of identity are strategically 
and institutionally posed,” that is to say the position from which judge-
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ments are made (47). Rey Chow has this to say about the signifi cance of 
the colonial gaze in situations where traditional hierarchies of subject 
and object are subverted:
Contrary to the model of Western hegemony in which the col-
onizer is seen as a primary, active “gaze” subjugating the native 
as passive “object,” I want to argue that it is actually the colo-
nizer who feels looked at by the native’s gaze. This gaze, which 
is neither a threat nor a retaliation, makes the colonizer “con-
scious” of himself, henceforth “refl ected” in the native-object. 
(139) 
So Adela begins to become conscious of herself because for the fi rst time 
she “sees” herself through Indian eyes. Coping with India involves learn-
ing to see anew, in processes of celebratory focalization like those prac-
tised by Mrs. Moore. New ways of seeing lead inevitably to new ways 
of speaking, signalled by her quotation of First Corinthians Chapter 
Thirteen: “good will and more good will and more good will. Though I 
speak with the tongues of . . .”(51). Mrs. Moore’s ability to see India and 
Indians in ways which distinguish her from the other Anglo-Indians at 
Chandrapore undermines Lin’s claim that
In the novel, Forster frequently shows that “Englishness” is 
absolutely incompatible with and accordingly superior to 
“Indianness.” As a member of the English middle class who 
deeply cherished Victorian middle-class values throughout 
his life, Forster’s concept of Englishness is best understood as 
“English middle-classness,” which, according to Forster, repre-
sents the quintessence of England. (135) 
What I call Mrs. Moore’s “celebratory focalization” of India in the pre-
Marabar part of the novel enables her to connect with “Indianness,” but 
at the price of her identifi cation with “Englishness.” It is signifi cant for 
example that the visionary sequence in the Mosque when Mrs. Moore 
meets Aziz takes place because she has wandered away from the perfor-
mance of “Cousin Kate” staged at the Club for an exclusively Anglo-
Indian audience. 
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The “liberal humanist” characters—Adela Quested, Mrs. Moore, 
Cyril Fielding—apprehend cultural difference through altered processes 
of focalization. I equate this with the perception that Western civilisa-
tion is unable to deal with the racial, social and historical complexities of 
India. I have already sketched the ways in which Adela’s momentous re-
traction of the charges against Aziz turns on altered processes of seeing. 
Similarly, Mrs. Moore’s conceptual and ideological focalization of Aziz 
following the meeting in the Mosque diverges from the typical stereo-
types of Anglo-India, as is evident in the following passage:
. . . he had alternatively whined over his grievances and pa-
tronised her, had run a dozen ways in a single sentence, had 
been unreliable, inquisitive, vain. Yes, it was all true, but how 
false as a summary of the man; the essential life of him had been 
slain. (34–35; my emphasis)
Cyril Fielding also has moments of epiphany. These recall Mrs. Moore’s 
faith that the truth of emotion rather than the truth of reason can build 
bridges between India and Anglo-India. When Aziz shows him a pho-
tograph of his dead wife Fielding “sees” his Indian friend as though for 
the fi rst time: “He was astonished, as a traveller who suddenly sees, be-
tween the stones of the desert, fl owers. The fl owers have been there all 
the time, but suddenly he sees them” (113).
Altered seeing leads to altered speech. After Aziz has been arrested 
following the Marabar incident, Fielding pleads with McBryde, the 
District Superintendent of Police, to speak to Adela in the hope of clear-
ing Aziz:
“I only wanted to ask her whether she is certain, dead certain, 
that it was Aziz who followed her into the cave.”
 “Possibly my wife might ask her that much.”
 “But I wanted to ask her. I wanted someone who believes in 
him to ask her.”
 “What difference does that make?”
 “She is among people who disbelieve in Indians.”
 “Well, she tells her own story, doesn’t she?”
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 “I know, but she tells it to you.” (167) 
Fielding, acutely conscious of the racism of the Raj, knows that Aziz will 
not be fairly tried by Anglo-India. Yet despite the schoolmaster’s enlight-
ened values the narrator makes the limitations of this ideological posi-
tion clear.11 In an imperial context no member of the ruling class can see 
India steadily or whole, to borrow Matthew Arnold’s categories, because 
there can be no true reciprocity between governors and governed: 
At the moment when he was throwing in his lot with Indians, 
he realized the profundity of the gulf that divided him from 
them. They always do something disappointing. Aziz had tried 
to run away from the police, Mohammed Latif had not checked 
the pilfering. And now Hamidullah!—instead of raging and 
denouncing, he temporised. Are Indians cowards? No, but 
they are bad starters and occasionally jib. Fear is everywhere; the 
British Raj rests on it; the respect and courtesy Fielding himself en-
joyed were unconscious acts of propitiation. (170; my emphasis) 
In the examples I have discussed, altered ways of seeing differentiate the 
perspectives of the “liberal humanist” protagonists (Adela, Mrs. Moore, 
Fielding) from the racist and zenophobic perspectives of the Raj. Yet the 
insights of these somewhat unusual characters are impotent. They are 
not part of the power structure of the British administration of India 
and they cannot implement any lasting change. All three will end up 
leaving India; like the “omniscient” narrator and the implied author, 
they are unable to apprehend Hindu India. 
5. Omniscient Narrator and Implied Author 
My fi nal concern has to do with the ambiguities generated by Forster’s 
omniscient narrator. The use Forster makes of narration is politically 
signifi cant. The perspectives of the implied author—elusive, complex, 
diffi cult to pin down, “inferred and assembled by the reader from all the 
components of the text” (Rimmon-Kenan 87)– emerge from the many 
passages controlled by the narrator. Readers trained to trust the voice of 
the author in a traditional text may at fi rst be bewildered by a discourse 
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of multiple contradictions, evasions and ambivalences. Forster’s inter-
rogation of liberal humanism in the context of the Raj is revealed by 
his deployment of the “omniscient” narrator. Take the Prologue to the 
“Caves” section of the novel for instance, where the authorial voice de-
scribes from a panoramic and omniscient perspective the Marabar out-
posts “which bear no relation to anything dreamt or seen.” Placed in “a 
relation of dominant specularity,” to borrow Colin MacCabe’s phrase, 
the reader is invited to look through a transparent window at a world 
unproblematically out there (McCabe 39). But Forster uses the authori-
tative metalanguage, characterized by MacCabe as essential to the classic 
realist text, to obscure rather than reveal what is described, (as I argue 
more fully elsewhere). We are forced to take note of what we can look 
at but not understand. Western power and knowledge, embodied in the 
panoptic gaze, is undermined by such a strategy. In the context of the 
Marabar Caves, looking is not necessarily knowing, and it is certainly 
not controlling. 
The narrator, whose liberal humanism I align with that of Mrs. Moore, 
Adela Quested and Cyril Fielding, swings between feats of sympathetic 
identifi cation with Indians, and complicity with the most damaging and 
potentially dangerous stereotypes of Anglo-Indian thinking. Scathing 
about the zenophobia, insularity and complacency of the petty offi cials 
whom we meet at work and play in Chandrapore, he is nevertheless 
as excluded from the discourse of Hindu India as any of the Anglo-
Indians, and he is strikingly inconsistent in his attitudes towards Aziz. 
Here is an example of the sympathetic stance in which Aziz’s thoughts 
are rendered in consonant psycho-narration:12
His memory was good, and for so young a man he had read 
largely; the themes he preferred were the decay of Islam and 
the brevity of love. They listened delighted, for they took the 
public view of poetry, not the private which obtains in England. 
It never bored them to hear words, words; they breathed them 
with the cool night air, never stopping to analyse; the name of 
the poet, Hafi z, Hali, Iqbal, was suffi cient guarantee. India—
a hundred Indias—whispered outside beneath the indifferent 
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moon, but for the time India seemed one and their own, and 
they regained their departed greatness by hearing its departure 
lamented. (16–17)
In the above passage the reader is swept into the narrator’s delight in 
Indian logophilia, and the implication that the love of poetry should 
transform the lives of individuals, as it seldom does in England. The 
point at which this celebration of culture becomes sentimental nostal-
gia is blurred and softened by the affectionate humour of the Indians’ 
interactions. 
In places the narrator participates in the double vision exhibited by 
Mrs. Moore, registering the mismatch between actions and the motives 
that have prompted them. An example is the Bridge Party, where Ronny 
has just remarked: “The great point to remember is that no one who’s 
here matters; those who matter don’t come” (39). Distancing himself 
from such ungenerous parochialism, the narrator recounts that
Some kites hovered overhead, impartial; over the kites passed 
the mass of a vulture, and with an impartiality exceeding all, 
the sky, not deeply coloured but translucent, poured light from 
its whole circumference. It seemed unlikely that the series 
stopped here. Beyond the sky must not there be something 
that overarches all the skies, more impartial even than they? 
Beyond which again . . . (40).
This is very like the thoughts attributed to Mrs. Moore as she pon-
ders her need to speak of God: “She must needs pronounce his name 
frequently, as the greatest she knew, yet she had never found it less ef-
fi cacious. Outside the arch there seemed always an arch, beyond the re-
motest echo a silence” (51–2). Capable of such epiphanies, the narrator 
nevertheless degenerates into Chandrapore’s mindless generalisations in 
remarks that patronise Aziz. Consider the following:
Like most Orientals, Aziz overrated hospitality, mistaking it for 
intimacy, and not seeing that it is tainted with the sense of pos-
session. It was only when Mrs. Moore or Fielding was near him 
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that he saw further, and knew that it is more blessed to receive 
than to give. (141) 
The arguments I have put forward are intended to interrogate Lin’s in-
terpretation of A Passage to India. I fully agree with her that the novel 
is about cultural difference. But I have tried to show how the narrator’s 
discourse (which we also agree is key to the implied author’s perspec-
tives), demonstrates Forster’s insight into the contradictions of liberal 
humanism as a philosophy adequate to govern India. In my view the 
novel does not, as Lin maintains, demonstrate “the incommensurability 
of Englishness and Indianness” in order “to subordinate the other into 
inferior categories so that the ruling of it can be properly justifi ed” (Lin 
133). But it does at every juncture dramatize ideas of cultural difference 
between India and Anglo-India and between Hindu and Islamic India.
Where I further disagree with Lin is in her contention that “the dif-
ferences between Englishness and Indianness are not just temporary, 
not just time-and-space specifi c; rather they are transcendental insofar 
as they are culturally and racially determined” (135). This conclusion 
is undermined by the novel’s closing lines, with their insistence on the 
temporary (“No, not yet”) impossibility of Anglo-Indian/Indian entente. 
Indeed, the end of the novel has frequently been read as an anti-imperial 
manifesto: not until the Raj is ended can a friendship like that between 
Aziz and Fielding take fi rm root. By no coincidence, this fi nal insight 
is given to the narrator, who is now speaking for the “hundred voices” 
of India.
Analyzing “the problem of positioning Englishness in relation to 
Indianness” (136) Lin remarks that “Aziz’s lack of the power to resist 
is scarcely meant to suggest the causal relation between the presence of 
the sovereign masters and the slave mentality of the colonized subject” 
(144). But this asymmetrical relation between governors and the gov-
erned is precisely what is at stake. Here again the narrator holds the key 
to Forster’s perspective on the self-abasement of the colonial subject, 
showing (as postcolonial writers as dissimilar as Frantz Fanon and V.S. 
Naipaul have insisted) that mimicry is a direct result of the unequal 
power relations inevitable in the colonial encounter. 
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Lin’s reading of the novel as valorizing English reasonableness, par-
ticularly in the “rationality and bravery” of Ronny Heaslop, is at odds 
with the narrator’s interventions (139). Consider the following passage:
Ronny’s religion was of the sterilized Public School brand, 
which never goes bad, even in the tropics. Wherever he en-
tered, mosque, cave, or temple, he retained the spiritual out-
look of the Fifth Form, and condemned as “weakening” any 
attempt to understand them. (250)
This account of infl exibility and zenophobia could hardly be more dam-
aging as a description of a colonial administrator responsible for the wel-
fare of subject peoples.
Finally, Lin’s interpretation of the crucial Marabar catastrophe turns 
on the binary she believes the novel constructs between Indian sexuality 
as “fallenness” and English sexuality as “culture and discipline”:
The Indians’ wantonness, wildness, and the practice of polyga-
my are set against the English highly civilized practice of sex in 
the form of “love” “engagement” “marriage” and monogamy. 
(148)
This contention seems to be based on the narrator’s pathologically am-
bivalent attitude towards Aziz, which I have already sketched. At times 
empathetic, it is also capable of sexual smuttiness. But as I have suggest-
ed, the narrator’s perspectives are ironized by the implied author. Thus 
Lin’s reference to “the English’s highly civilized practice of sex” is diffi -
cult to reconcile with the Marabar crisis at the heart of the novel, which 
springs from the aridity of Adela’s engagement to Ronny Heaslop. On 
entering the Caves, she is assailed by the momentous realisation that de-
spite their shared “common sense and good will” she and Ronny do not 
love each other. These thoughts—immediately repressed—re-emerge in 
the Court Room epiphany when she speaks “across a sort of darkness to 
Mr. McBryde” (221). The Court Room sequence confers a new iden-
tity upon Adela and culminates in her giving up her controlling desire 
to “see the real India.” The narrator remarks: “Although her schoolmis-
tressy manner remained, she was no longer examining life, but being 
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examined by it; she had become a real person” (238). Adela’s traumatic 
Court Room immersion in her unconscious is simultaneously personal 
and social. Detaching herself from a loveless commitment to Ronny 
Heaslop she is also disengaging from the race and class constraints of 
colonial marriage. 
Conclusion
Lin sets out to expose what she takes to be the limitations of Forster’s 
informing ideology—liberal humanism. She believes that Forster’s inde-
terminacy, and his representation of cultural difference, provide the his-
torical and epistemic justifi cation for colonial expansion. In her reading, 
A Passage to India seeks to legitimate the British administration of India. 
My response points out the ways in which Forster’s novel problematizes 
the ideology of humanism in his investigation of cultural difference be-
tween rulers and ruled. As Brian May argues:
Forsterian liberalism is neither old-fashioned nor contempt-
ible: it is not the silly relic many critics have taken it to be. 
Rather, Forster’s liberalism is chastened and concentrated, 
and yet made provisional, by the presence of an ironist atti-
tude towards language, the self, and the community. Which is 
to say, Forster’s liberal anticipates in remarkable ways [the late 
twentieth century philosopher] Rorty’s neoliberal, the “liberal 
ironist.” (187)
A Passage to India anticipates the work of Homi Bhabha, for whom this 
novel is a seminal text in understanding colonialism. For him the con-
cepts of indeterminacy and difference are politically subversive, enabling 
the formation of a subaltern subjectivity. As Shaobo Xie notes, “the 
emergence of the split colonial subject not only threatens to defeat the 
Western enlightenment historical representation of the non-Western, 
but deconstructs the unity of the Western nation itself ” (158). The nov-
el’s often surprising deployment of the visual also links A Passage to India 
to contemporary fi lm theory in the way it investigates connections be-
tween political power and the imperial gaze. Finally, the ironies that 
pervade A Passage to India can be seen, in Armstrong’s terms, to edu-
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cate the reader into sustaining “the contradictory attitude of suspecting 
ideals one believes in and believing ideals one suspects” (382). Forster’s 
“omniscient” narrator shows how Western modes of perception, based 
on a paradigm of vision or rationality, fail to comprehend India. Yet the 
same narrator sometimes colludes with the racially discriminatory ste-
reotyping of India and Indians in ways that entrench the power of the 
Raj. Forster’s ambivalence towards the colonial project stands revealed 
on every page. 
Notes
 1 Here I fi nd Paul Armstrong’s notion of “liberal irony”—derived from the work 
of the contemporary pragmatist Richard Rorty—persuasive. Armstrong argues 
that “A Passage to India attempts to stage for the reader the contradictions of 
liberal irony. Both Forster and Rorty desire a politics which would enable us 
to act with a sophisticated, sceptical awareness that all norms are provisional 
and contestable and that any consensus is potentially deceptive and hegemonic, 
but also with a defensible faith in ideals of justice and community as necessary 
guides for social change” (367).
 2 Rimmon-Kenan defi nes this elusive concept:
  the implied author is the governing consciousness of the work as a whole, 
the source of the norms embodied in the work. Its relation to the real 
author is admitted to be of great psychological complexity . . . while the 
fl esh-and-blood author is subject to the vicissitudes of real life, the im-
plied author of a particular work is conceived as a stable entity, ideally 
consistent with itself within the work. (86–87) 
  For Seymour Chatman the implied author “is a way of naming and analysing 
the textual intent of narrative fi ctions under a single term but without recourse 
to biographism” (75). Chatman’s formulation allows for a less stable self-identity 
than Rimmon-Kenan’s. 
 3 On this topic, see Benita Parry: “to interpret the fi ction as an act of recolonisa-
tion which reproduces the dominant colonial discourse would be to ignore—
egregiously—the text’s heterogeneous modes and its complex dialogic structure” 
(28), Judith Scherer Herz: “Language is at once the subject of A Passage to India, 
its intractable medium, its clarifying agency, and its astounding, if fi nally hap-
less, accomplishment” (59) and Molly Tinsley: “If . . . orderly hypotaxis is a 
correlative for European civilisation, it is not surprising to fi nd the Forster of 
A Passage to India exploring ways to discard or at least disrupt it” (71). Leland 
Monk maintains that “the last section of A Passage to India departs from the 
standard practices of literary modernism, but it does so only to re-formulate 
under the guise of Hindu mysticism a regressive providentialism wherein a tran-
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scendental Being presides over narrative events and Nothing is left to chance” 
(401). Wendy Moffat relates the novel’s ambiguity to Forster’s homosexuality: 
“Ambiguity is a protective stance for Forster, not so much because he is afraid of 
certainty . . . but because he recognises how much experience one person’s cer-
tainty excludes. . . . Like many of his not overtly homosexual fi ctions, A Passage 
to India fi gures Forster’s unity in essentially androcentric terms: the desperate 
embrace between Aziz and Fielding at the end demonstrates their most passion-
ate, and most unattainable, love. That the reader’s comfortable experience of 
centrality be continually displaced is the object of his fi ction: the method in A 
Passage to India embodies its moral message” (Moffat 339). Barbara Rosecrance 
explores Forster’s combined use of authorial omniscience with his rhythmic use 
of image and symbol, concluding that language in A Passage to India “moves 
between polarities of exclusion and inclusion, separation and unity, discord and 
harmony, negation and affi rmation . . . the novel’s burden is the demonstration 
of discord, the search for unity its motive power” (242). Michael Orange shows 
how the language of A Passage contrasts Western and Indian ways of knowing: 
“In this novel the language of cognition, as the expression of thought and feel-
ing in hierarchy subject to ordering by time, is avowedly insuffi cient as a means 
of incarnating mystical experience which exists outside time and is subversive 
of hierarchical order” (143). Finally, John Beer relates the novel’s complexity to 
Forster’s claim “I tried to indicate the human predicament in a universe which 
is not, so far, comprehensible to our minds,” commenting that “it is not per-
haps surprising to discover that the use of the past defi nite tense, and of strict 
chronological defi nition, is sometimes violated, that the plot though more or 
less linear leads not to a conclusion but to an uncertainty, and that the picture of 
the universe is . . . incoherent, discontinuous, multivocal (‘India in her thousand 
voices”) and largely undecipherable” (126).
 4 Rimmon-Kenan, following Genette, offers the following defi nition of focaliza-
tion:
  The story is presented in the text through the mediation of some “prism,” 
“perspective,” “angle of vision,” verbalized by the narrator though not 
necessarily his. (71) 
  She shows that narration (who speaks) and focalization (who sees) need not co-
incide in a given text, and believes that focalization should be broadened from its 
optical-photographic connotations “to include cognitive, emotive and ideologi-
cal orientation” (71). Jahn et al suggest the following test to determine who the 
focalizer in a given text is: “Since s/he is the grammatical subject that belongs to 
the verbs that express thought, feeling and perception, one has only to ask: Who 
thinks, feels, sees, hears, remembers, etc. whatever is being narrated in a given 
passage?” (16).
 5 Shaobo Xie is illuminating on how the notion of cultural difference is politically 
empowering for Bhabha:
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  What happens at the point of contact between the colonizer and the 
colonized is the emergence of the Third Space of enunciation, the hy-
brid, ambivalent, indeterminate space of signifi cation . . . Bhabha con-
structs a third space, an interstitial locus of meaning, between the indig-
enous and the European, the colonizer and the colonized. This newly 
emergent cultural space proves subversive to both the indigenous and 
the Western, allowing neither of them cultural and discursive continu-
ity. (157) 
 6 See my “Arches and Echoes” (52–67), where I argue that Forster in this novel 
employs an alternation of commentary and dialogue in which commentary ab-
dicates its usual ordering function and reveals far less than dialogue. 
 7 Fielding’s thoughts are communicated by the narrator: “he who would keep in 
with Englishwomen must drop the Indians. The two wouldn’t combine. Useless 
to blame either party, useless to blame them for blaming one another” (62).
 8 Commenting on Freud’s “The Uncanny” Martin Jay remarks:
  [Freud] came to believe that the very desire to know (Wisstrieb), rather 
than being innocent, was itself ultimately derived from an infantile desire 
to see, which had sexual origins. . . . Freud also explored the powerful 
symbolism of the eyes. Blindness, for example, could imply castration, as 
in the Oedipus legend or in E.T.A. Hoffmann’s story, “The Sandman.” 
Freud’s discussion of the latter appeared in his celebrated essay of 1919 
on “The Uncanny,” which he followed Friedrich Schelling in defi ning as 
“the name for everything that ought to have remained secret and hidden 
but has come to light” (332). 
  Julia Kristeva is illuminating on the unheimlich: “Explicitly given limited scope, 
as it was at fi rst connected with esthetic problems and emphasized texts by 
E.T.A. Hoffmann, Freud’s Das Unheimliche (1919) surreptitiously goes beyond 
that framework and the psychological phenomenon of ‘uncanny strangeness’ as 
well, in order to acknowledge itself as an investigation into anguish generally 
speaking and, in a fashion that is even more universal, into the dynamics of the 
unconscious” (182).
 9 The signifi cance of voice and gaze in reassembling personal and political power 
structures is explored in recent work by Elizabeth Walls and A.A.Markley. Walls 
maintains that “the crux of Forster’s effort is an interrogation of hegemonic 
rhetoric; Passage is an attempt both to criticize and, more covertly, to stifl e the 
authoritative voice of British rule” (57). She argues that Adela’s voice at the Trial, 
doubly seditious because orchestrated within “a subordinate position inside the 
dominant legal structure engendered by the Raj” (72) succeeds in disengaging 
her from Victorian social constraints governing gender, race and class in impe-
rial India. A.A. Markley draws attention to Forster’s creation of a homoerotic 
subjectivity in his preoccupation with the male gaze. Switching the gendered 
object of the male gaze from female to male, Forster reconfi gures the male gaze as 
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Jacques Lacan defi ned it: “by disrupting the progress of his narratives at impor-
tant moments during which the reader is invited to gaze on a tableau in which 
the male body is the central focal point, Forster invented a kind of narration that 
powerfully expresses male homoerotic desire while shrewdly maintaining the 
veneer of heterosexual conventionality” (268). Markley concentrates on Forster’s 
earlier novels and does not deal with A Passage to India at all. But I would suggest 
that A Passage is similarly reliant on signifi cant tableaux in which the (female) 
gaze reverses cultural categories. Adela’s perception of the beauty of the Punkah 
Wallah is one such moment. It precipitates a whole chain of altered seeing which 
culminates in Adela’s exculpation of Aziz.
 10 Forster inscribes Adela’s difference from Anglo-India in her very name, Quested. 
Writing about travel literature written by women, Sidonie Smith remarks: 
  “Woman” cannot quest precisely because . . . the “law of the home” . . . 
organizes a set of gender determinations in the economy of travel. That is, 
“woman” is always already “domesticated.” Discourses of travel, includ-
ing those informed by primitive tropes, constitute the traveller as “male” 
and the one allied with home as “female.” Or they constitute the exotic 
woman as a menace to the traveller, a threat to his sovereignty and to the 
profi t of his travels. (300)
 11 As Andrew Drew remarks, “A Passage to India is not a humanistic novel. It reveals 
that the very best sort of humanism (“goodwill plus culture and intelligence”) is 
incapable of sustaining a single friendship, let alone the whole world” (87).
 12 Psycho-narration is a blend between the author’s perspective and the character’s 
own words. Jeremy Hawthorn explains, following Steven Cohan and Linda M. 
Shires, that psycho-narration can “either be consonant (following a character’s 
own self-apprehension) or dissonant (moving back from a character’s own per-
spective)” (130). 
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